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Abstract: The Elgamal encryption scheme is best described in the setting of any finite cyclic group. Its classic case is typically 
presented in the multiplicative group *pZ  of the ring of integers modulo a prime p and the multiplicative groups 
*
2m
F  of finite 
fields of characteristic two. The Elgamal cryptosystem was modified to deal with Gaussian integers, and extended to work with 
group of units of Zp[x]/<x
2
>. In this paper, we consider yet another extension to the Elgamal cryptosystem employing the 
second group of units of Zn and the second group of units of Z2[x]/<h(x)>, where h(x) is an irreducible polynomial. We 
describe the arithmetic needed in the new setting, and present examples, proofs and algorithms to illustrate the applicability of 
the proposed scheme. We implement our algorithms and conduct testing to evaluate the accuracy, efficiency and security of the 
modified cryptographic scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
The Classical Elgamal Public Key encryption scheme 
is perhaps one of the most popular and widely used 
cryptosystems. It is described in the setting of the 
multiplicative group *pZ . The multiplicative group of 
*
pZ  = {1, 2, ..., p-1} is a cyclic group generated by a 
generator from the group [9]. The following algorithms 
show how the Elgamal cryptosystem functions: 
Algorithm 1: Key Generation 
A should do the following: 
1. Generate a large random prime p and find the generator 
α of *pZ . 
2. Select a random integer a, 1 ≤ a ≤ p−2 and compute αa 
mod p. 
3. A's public key is (p, α, α
a
) and A's private key is a. 
Algorithm 2: Encryption 
B should do the following: 
1. Obtain A's authentic public key (p, α, α
a
). 
2. Represent the message as an integer m in the range {0, 1, 
2, …, p−1}. 
3. Select a random integer k, where 2 ≤ k ≤ p−2. 
4. Compute 
kαγ ≡ mod p and kam ).(αδ ≡ mod p.  
5. Send the ciphertext c = (γ, δ) to A. 
Algorithm 3: Decryption 
A should do the following: 
1. Use the private key a to compute γ1−p−a mod p.  
2. Compute 
ac .γ δ−≡  mod p to recover the message m. 
 
However, the Elgamal cryptosystem can be 
generalized to work in any finite cyclic group G. 
The security of the scheme is based on the 
intractability of the Discrete Logarithm Problem 
[12] in the group G. G should be carefully chosen 
so that the group operations in G would be 
relatively easy to apply for efficiency. Moreover, 
the Discrete Logarithm Problem in G should be 
computationally infeasible. 
Cross [3] gave a classification of all Gaussian 
integers β such that the group of units of the 
quotient ring Z[i]/<β> is cyclic. So, one may 
consider Elgamal public-key cryptosystem using 
the cyclic group of units of Z[i]/<β>, where β = 
1+i, (1+i)², (1+i)³, p, (1+i) p, πⁿ, (1+i) πⁿ, p is a 
prime integer of the form 4k+3, and π is a 
Gaussian prime with |π|2 is a prime integer of the 
form 4k+1.  
In [6], the authors described the second group 
of units of Zn, denoted by U
2
(Zn), and 
characterized the cases for n that make U
2
(Zn) 
cyclic. They applied the Elgamal scheme in 
U
2
(Zn)  (in the cases where it is cyclic). 
The authors in [10] determined the structure of 
the group of units of the quotient ring 
Fq[x]/<f(x)>, where f(x) is a polynomial over a 
finite field Fq of order q. Using this 
decomposition, a characterization of the quotient 
ring of polynomials over finite fields with cyclic 
group of units was given. In [8], this 
classification was applied to extend Elgamal 
scheme to the settings of the group of units of 
Zp[x]/<x
2
> and Z2[x]/<h(x)>, where h(x) is a 
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product of irreducible polynomials whose 
degrees are pairwise relatively prime. 
The purpose of this paper is to use the 
characterization of the quotient ring of 
polynomials over finite fields and the 
characterization of the second group of units in 
order to apply the Elgamal scheme in the second 
group of units of Z2[x]/<h(x)>, where h(x) is an 
irreducible polynomial of degree n. 
The rest of the paper is organized follows: Section 2 
summarizes the second group of units of Zn and 
describes the construction of U
2
(Zn). In section 3, the 
construction of the second group of units of 
Z2[x]/<h(x)>, where h(x) is an irreducible polynomial, 
is illustrated. Section 4 investigates the Elgamal 
scheme in this setting. Section 5 tests and evaluates the 
modified algorithms. Finally, section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. The Elgamal Cryptosystem over the 
Second Group of Units of Zn 
Before discussing the extended Elgamal 
cryptosystem, we present the following theorems 
and definitions that are necessary for our work. 
• Theorem 1: Fundamental Theorem of Abelian 
Groups, every finite Abelian group is a direct 
product of cyclic groups of prime power order 
[1]. 
Let R be a finite commutative ring with 
identity. By the fundamental theorem of finite 
Abelian groups, the group of units, U(R), is 
isomorphic to the direct product of cyclic 
groups, say U(R)≅Zn1×Zn2×…×Zni. Hence, the 
multiplicative group U(R) supports a ring 
structure by defining the operations ⊕ and ⊗ 
that make (U(R), ⊕, ⊗) a ring isomorphic to 
the direct sum Zn1⊕Zn2⊕…⊕Zni. The ring 
Zn1⊕Zn2⊕…⊕Zni is denoted as R
2
. 
• Definition 1: The second group of units of R is 
defined as the group of units of the ring U(R) 
[6]: U
2
(R) = U(U(R)) ≅ U (R2). 
The authors considered the problem of 
determining the values of n that make U
2
(Zn) 
cyclic. The result was as follows: 
• Theorem 2: Let p and q be odd prime integers and α 
be a positive integer. Then, U
2
(Zn) is cyclic iff one 
of the following is true: 
1. n = 2
α
.3.p, where α = 1, 2 or 3.  
2. n = 15. 
3. n = 3.p, where p = 4k+3 and 2k+1 = q
α
.  
4. n = 2.3
α
, 2
2
.3
α
, 2
3
.3
α
 or 2
4
.3.    
5. n = 2 , 4, 8, or 16. 
6. n = 5 or 2p
α
 +1 , where 2p
α
 +1 is a prime integer. 
7. n = 3
α
. 
The results can be classified into two cases: 
• Case 1: Both U(Zn) and U
2
(Zn) are cyclic, as 
known U(Zn) is cyclic when n = 2, 4, p
α
 or 2p
α
, 
where α ≥ 1 and p is an odd prime integer. So 
out of the previous seven cases for n, only the 
following belong to case 1: 
1. n = 2.3
α
, since n is in the form of 2p
α
.
 
 
2. n = 2 or 4. 
3. n = 5 or 2p
α
+1, where 2p
α
 +1 is a prime 
integer. 
4. n = 3
α
,
 
since n is a power of an odd prime. 
• Case 2: U2(Zn) is cyclic, whereas U(Zn) is not 
cyclic, 
1. n = 2
α
.3.p , where α = 1, 2 or 3.  
2. n = 15. 
3. n = 3.p, where p = 4k+3 and 2k+1 = q
α
. 
4. n = 2
2
.3
α
, 2
3
.3
α
 or 2
4
.3. 
5. n = 8, or 16. 
To construct the second group of units U
2
(Zn), we 
follow these steps: 
1. Form the group of units U(Zn) = {a∈Zn: gcd(a,n) = 
1}. The order of U(Zn) is ϕ(n). 
2. Find a generator r of U(Zn). 
3. Write U(Zn) in the form {r
0
, r
1
, …, r
ϕ(n)−1
}. 
4. Find U
2
(Zn) = {r
i  
mod n: gcd(i, ϕ(n)) = 1}. 
Note that the order of U
2
(Zn) is ϕ(ϕ(n)). 
For example, let n = 23. Then U(Z23) = {1, 2, 3, …, 
22} and ϕ(23) = 22. A generator of U(Z23)  is r = 5 as 
shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Elements of U(Z23). 
U(Z23) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
5i 50 5
2 516 54 51 518 519 56 510 53 59 
 
U(Z23) 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
5i 520 5
14 521 517 58 57 512 515 55 513 511 
 
U2(Z23)  = {5
i : gcd(i, 22) = 1} 
= {51, 519, 53, 59, 521, 517, 57, 515, 55, 513}. 
Reducing the powers modulo 23, we have:  
U
2
(Z23) = {5, 10, 20, 17, 11, 21, 19, 15, 7,14}. 
The order of U
2
(Z23) is ϕ(ϕ(23)) = 10.  
The operations of the ring (U(Zn), . , ⊗) are  defined as 
follows [4]: 
1. Addition operation:  x.y = xy mod n. 
2. Multiplication operation: x⊗y= )(modlog nx yr , where 
r is the generator of U(Zn).  
3. The power operation: Let θ be an element of U2(Zn) 
such that θ = rk and r is a generator of U(Zn). Then 
N
kN r)(=θ . 
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The identity of the second group of units of Zn is r, 
where r is the generator of U(Zn). 
For the construction of U
2
(Zn) in case 2, consider: 
• Lemma 1: Let n and m be any two positive integers, 
then Zmn ≅ Zm ×Zn iff gcd(m,n) = 1.  
Hence, for n = n1. n2… ni, Zn ≅ 1nZ × 2nZ ×…× inZ iff 
n1, n2, …, ni are pairwise relatively prime. 
• Lemma 2:  
1. U(Z2) ≅{0}. 
2. U(Z4) ≅ Z2. 
3. 2222
)( −⊕≅ kk ZZZU , for k ≥ 3. 
4. 11)( −⊕≅ − ppp ZZZU nn , where p is an odd prime. 
• Theorem 3: If R = R1⊕ R2⊕…⊕ Ri, then U(R) ≅ 
U(R1)× U(R2)×…×U(Ri). 
For the case where n = 3p, 
U(Zn) ≅ U(Z3)× U(Zp) ≅ Z2×Zp−1.  
Hence, R
2
 = Z2⊕Zp−1 and  
 U
2
(R) ≅ U(R2) = U(Z2⊕Zp−1)  
          ≅ U(Z2)× U(Zp−1) ≅ U(Zp−1). 
• Definition 2: (Isomorphism Functions) 
1. The function f: U(Zmn)→U(Zm)×U(Zn) defined by 
f(a) = (a mod m, a mod n), for all a ∈ U(Zmn),       
is an isomorphism whenever (m,n) =1.   
2. The function f1: U(Zn)→ Zϕ(n) defined by                
f1(a) = logr a mod n, for all a ∈ Zϕ(n), is an 
isomorphism whenever U(Zn) is a cyclic and  r is 
a generator of U(Zn).  
 
The group U
2
(Zn) can be constructed as follows: 
 
1. Construct U(Zn), U(Z3) and U(Zp). 
2. Find G = { (a (mod 3), a (mod p)) : a∈U(Zn). 
3. Find a generator r of U(Z3) and a generator r1 of 
U(Zp). 
4. Write G in the form:  
   ( ){ }tt 1r (mod 3 ), r (mod p ) : 0 t 1 and 0 t p 21 1≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ −  . 
5. Form the set Z2⊕Zp−1 = {(t, t1)} and find G1, the 
set of its invertible elements. Note that (a, b) is 
invertible in Z2⊕Zp−1 iff a = 1 (invertible in Z2) 
and b is invertible in Zp−1. 
6. U
2
(Zn) is the set of elements in U
2
(Zn) 
corresponding to elements in G1. 
 
For example, let p = 11. Then, U(Z33) ≅U(Z3)×U(Z11) ≅ 
Z2⊕Zp−1, where U(Z33) =  {1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 
16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32}. Now, U(Z11) 
=  {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} has 2 as a generator. 
Similarly, 2 is a generator for U(Z3) = {1, 2}. The 
isomorphism between U(Z33), U(Z3)×U(Z11) and 
Z2⊕Z10 is  depicted in Table 2. The invertible elements 
in Z2⊕Z10 are:  {(1,1), (1,3), (1,9), (1,7)}. Then, U
2
(Z33) 
={2, 8, 17, 29}. 
Define the operations on U
2
(Zn) as follows. 
Multiplication in (U
2
(Zn), •) is defined by a•b = 
f
−1
(f(a)⊗f(b)),  
where f is the isomorphism f: U(Zn)→U(Z3)×U(Zp) in 
Definition 2, and  
    f(a)⊗f(b) = (a mod 3, a mod p)⊗(b mod 3, b mod p) 
= ((a mod 3)⊗3(b mod 3), (a mod p)⊗p (b mod p)), x⊗3y = 
xlogr
y and x⊗py = x
log
r1
y. 
Let a ∈ U2(Zn) and let N  be positive integer. Then, 
).,( 11
1
NN ttN
rrfa
−= The identity of U2(Zn) is the 
element a  = f
−1
(r, r1). 
 
Table 2. Isomorphism between U(Z33) and U(Z3)×U(Z11). 
U(Z33) 
U(Z3) 
×U(Z11) 
( ) Z2⊕Z10 U(Z33) 
U(Z3) 
×U(Z11) 
Z2⊕Z10 
1 (1,1) (20,20) (0,0) 17 (2,6) (1,9) 
2 (2,2) (21,21) (1,1) 19 (1,8) (0,3) 
4 (1,4) (20,22) (0,2) 20 (2,9) (1,6) 
5 (2,5) (21,24) (1,4) 23 (2,1) (1,0) 
7 (1,7) (20,27) (0,7) 25 (1,3) (0,8) 
8 (2,8) (21,23) (1,3) 26 (2,4) (1,2) 
10 (1,10) (20,25) (0,5) 28 (1,6) (0,9) 
13 (1,2) (20,21) (0,1) 29 (2,7) (1,7) 
14 (2,3) (21,28) (1,8) 31 (1,9) (0,6) 
16 (1,5) (20,24) (0,4) 32 (2,10) (1,5) 
2.1. Elgamal Cryptosystem over U
2
(Zn) for 
Case 1. 
Algorithm 4: Generator of U
2
(Zn)  
1. Find a generator θ1 of U(Zn). 
2. Write the order of U
2
(Zn) as ..... 21 21
i
ippp
ααα  
3. Select a random integer s, 0 ≤ s ≤ ϕ(n)−1, (s , ϕ(n)) = 1.  
4. For j = 1 to i, do: 
4.1. Compute .mod1 nj
pN
θ   
4.2. If ,1mod1
)(
θθ =nj
pNs
then go to step 3. 
5. Return s. 
For key generation, entity A does the following: 
Algorithm 5: Key Generation   
1. Find a generator θ1 of U(Zn). 
2. Find s using Algorithm 1. 
3. Compute the order of U
2
(Zn) using ϕ(ϕ(n)). 
4. Select a random integer a, 2 ≤ a ≤ϕ(ϕ(n))−1, and  
compute f = s
a
(mod ϕ(n)).    
5. A’s public key is (n, θ1, s, f) and A’s private key is a.   
B encrypts a message m for A using the algorithm 
below: 
Algorithm 6: Encryption  
1. B obtains A’s authentic public key (n, θ1, s, f).  
2. Represent the message as an integer in U
2
(Zn).  
3. Select a random integer k, 2 ≤ k ≤ ϕ(ϕ(n))−1. 
4. Compute q = s
k
(mod ϕ(n)), r = fk(mod ϕ(n)), γ = θk = θ1q 
(mod n) and δ ≡ mr (mod n). 
5. Send the ciphertext c = (q, δ) to A.   
To recover the plaintext m from c, A should do the 
following: 
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Algorithm 7: Decryption  
1. Use the private key a to compute b = ϕ(ϕ(n)) − a. 
2. Recover the message by computing t = q
b
(mod ϕ(n)) and 
δ t (mod n).  
Theorem 4 proves that the formula γ−a.δ (mod n) 
allows the recovery of the message m. The proof is for 
case 1. 
• Theorem 4: Given a generator θ of U2(Zn) such that 
θ =θ1s, where θ1 is a generator of U(Zn). Let γ ≡ θ 
r
(mod n) and δ ≡ m.(θ a)k (mod n). If s ∈ U2(Zn) such 
that: s ≡ γ−a. δ (mod n), then s = m. 
For example, consider the case where n = 3
3
.
 
Select the 
generators θ1 = 5 and θ = 2 so that s = 11. Entity A 
selects a = 3 and calculates s
a
 = 2
3
 ≡ (511)3 ≡ 11 (mod 
27) and f=11
3 ≡ 17 (mod ϕ(27)). A’s public key is 
(n=27, θ1=5, s=11, f=17). To encrypt m = 5, B selects 
an integer k = 4 and finds q = s
k 
= 11
4 ≡ 7 (mod ϕ(27)), 
r = f
k 
= 17
4 ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(27)), and δ ≡ 5r = 5 (mod 27). B 
sends (s
k 
= 7, δ = 5) to A. Finally, A computes b = 
ϕ(ϕ(n)) − a = 2 and t = qb(mod ϕ(n)) =1. Then A finds 
δ t = 51 (mod 27) = 5 = m.  
2.2. Elgamal Cryptosystem over U
2
(Zn)) for 
Case 2 
Algorithm 8: Generator of U
2
(Z3p)  
1. Find a generator θ1 of U(Zn). 
2. Write the order of U
2
(Zn) as ϕ(ϕ(n)) = ..... 21 21 iippp
ααα  
3. Select a random integer s, 0 ≤ s ≤ ϕ(p)−1, (s , ϕ(p)) = 1.  
4. For j = 1 to i, do: 
4.1 Compute .mod1 pj
pN
θ   
4.2 If ,1mod1
)(
θθ =pj
pNs then go to step 3. 
5. Use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to find θ, and s by 
solving the system of congruencies: x ≡ 2 (mod 3) and x ≡ 
θ1s (mod p). 
6. Return s. 
To generate the key when n =3.p, A uses the following: 
Algorithm 9: Key Generation   
1. Find a generator θ1 of U(Zn). 
2. Find s using Algorithm 1. 
3. Compute the order of U
2
(Zn) using ϕ(ϕ(p)). 
4. Select a random integer a, 2 ≤ a ≤ϕ(ϕ(p))−1, and  
compute f = s
a
(mod ϕ(n)).    
5. A’s public key is (n, θ1, s, f) and A’s private key is a.   
B encrypts a message m for A using the algorithm 
below: 
Algorithm 10: Encryption 
1. B obtains A’s authentic public key (n, θ1, s, f).  
2. Represent the message as an integer in U
2
(Zp).  
3. Select a random integer k, 2 ≤ k ≤ ϕ(ϕ(p))−1.  
4. Compute q = s
k
(mod ϕ(n)), r = fk(mod ϕ(p)), γ = θk = θ1q 
(mod n) and δ ≡ mr (mod n). 
5. Send the ciphertext c = (q, δ) to A.   
To recover the plaintext m from c, A should do the 
following: 
Algorithm 11 (Decryption) 
1. Use the private key a to compute b = ϕ(ϕ(p)) − a. 
2. Recover the message by computing t  = q
b
(mod ϕ(p)) and 
δ t (mod p).  
• Theorem 5: Let n =3.p and let θ  be a generator of 
U
2
(Zn) such that θ = (2, θ1s), where θ1 is a the 
generator of U(Zp). Let m∈U(Zp). Let γ ≡ θ r(mod n) 
and δ ≡ m.(θ a)k (mod n). If s ∈ U(Zp) such that s ≡ 
γ−a.δ (mod n), then s = m. 
For example, let p = 11. Then, ϕ(n) = 20, θ = 29 is a 
generator of U
2
(Z33), θ1 = 2 is a generator of U (Z11) 
with s = 7. If A uses a = 3, then f = s
a
 = 7
3 ≡ 3 (mod 
ϕ(11)). A’s public key is (p=11, θ1=2, s=7, f=3). To 
encrypt the message m = 5, B selects a random integer 
k = 2 and finds s
k 
= 7
2 ≡ 9 (mod ϕ(11)), γ ≡ (2, 
ks1θ mod 11) = (2,6), and δ≡5.(2,6). Finally, A 
computes b = 1 and γ1.δ ≡ (2,6).5.(2,6) ≡ 5.(2,29.29) ≡ 
5.(2,2) ≡ 5.   
3. Elgamal Cryptosystem over 
U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>)   
Let h(x) be an irreducible polynomial of degree n. 
Then, Z2[x]/<h(x)> = {a0+a1x+…+an−1x
n−1
: a0, …, 
an−1∈ Z2} is a field. The order of Z2[x]/<h(x)> is 2
n
 and 
its non-zero elements form a cyclic group 
U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) of order ϕ(h(x)) = 2n−1, see [7] for 
more details. 
• Theorem 6: U2(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) is cyclic iff one of the 
following conditions is satisfied: 
1. 2
n
 = q
α
+1 where q is an odd prime and α > 0. 
2. 2
n
 = q+1, where q is a Mersenne prime [2]. 
To construct U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>): 
1. Find a generator r of the group of units 
U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) 
2. Write U (Z2[x]/<h(x)>) ={r
0
, r
1
,… r
 ϕ(h(x)) −1
}.  
3. Find U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) = {r
i 
: gcd(i, 2
n
 −1) = 1}. 
4. Write U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) = {x : x ≡ r 
i 
mod h(x)}. 
For example, let h(x) = 1+ x + x
3
. Then, Z2[x]/<1+ x + 
x
3
>= {0, 1, x, 1+ x, x
2
, 1+ x
2
, x+ x
2
, 1+x+x
2
}, and 
U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) = {1, x, 1+ x, x
2
, 1+ x
2
, x+x
2
, 1+x+x
2
}. 
Using the fact that 1+x+x
3
 = 0 in Z2[x]/<1+x+x
3
>, we 
have 1 = (1+x)
0
, 1+x = (1+x)
1
, 1+x
2
 = (1+x)
2
, x
2
 = 
(1+x)
3
, 1+x+x
2
 = (1+x)
4
, x = (1+x)
5
, x+x
2 
= (1+x)
6
, and r 
= 1+ x is a generator. Hence, U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) = {x, 1+ 
x, x
2
, 1+ x
2
, x+x
2
, 1+x+x
2
}. 
Next, the Elgamal scheme is extended to the setting of 
the second group of units of U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>). 
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Algorithm 12: Generator of U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) 
1. Find a generator θ1(x) of U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>).  
2. Write the order of U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) as ϕ(h(x)) = 
..... 21 21
i
ippp
ααα  
3. Select a random integer s, 0 ≤ s ≤ ϕ(h(x)) − 1, such that 
(s, ϕ(h(x)) = 1.  
4. For j = 1 to i, do: 
4.1 Compute θ1(x)N/Pj mod h(x). 
4.2 If 
)/(
)(1
jpNs
xθ mod h(x) = θ1(x), then go to step 3. 
5. Return s. 
In order to generate the corresponding public and 
private keys, entity A follows the steps below: 
Algorithm 13: Key Generation 
1. Select an irreducible polynomial h(x) of degree n. 
2. Find a generator θ1(x) of U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>). 
3. Find s using Algorithm 12. 
4. Compute ϕ(ϕ(h(x))), the order of U2(Z2[x]/<h(x)>). 
5. Select a random integer a, 0 ≤ a ≤ ϕ(ϕ(h(x))) − 1, and 
compute f = s
a
 (mod ϕ(h(x))).  
6. A’s public key is (n, h(x), θ1(x), s, f) and A’s private key is 
a.   
B encrypts a message m(x) for A using the algorithm 
below: 
Algorithm 14: Encryption 
1. B obtains A’s authentic public key (n, h(x), θ1(x), s, f).  
2. Represent a message m(x) in U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>).  
3. Select a random integer k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ ϕ(ϕ(h(x))) − 1. 
4. Compute q = s
k
 (mod ϕ(h(x))), r = sk (mod ϕ(h(x))), γ(x) 
= θ(x)k = θ1(x)q  (mod h(x)), and δ(x) = m(x)r (mod h(x)). 
5. Send the ciphertext c = (q, δ(x)) to A.   
To recover m(x) from c, A should do the following: 
Algorithm 15: Decryption 
1. Use the private key a to compute b = ϕ(ϕ(h(x))) − a.  
2. Recover the message by computing t = q
b
 (mod ϕ(h(x))) 
and δ(x)k (mod h(x)).  
 
• Theorem 7: Let θ(x) = θ1(x)s be a generator of 
U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>), where θ1(x) is the generator of 
U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>), and let γ(x) ≡ θ(x)k (mod h(x)), and 
δ(x) = m(x).(θ(x)a)k (mod h(x)).  If s(x) ∈ 
U
2
(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) such that s(x) ≡ γ(x)−a.δ(x)  (mod 
h(x)), then s(x) = m(x). 
For example, consider h(x) = 1+x+x
3
. A selects the 
generator θ(x) = x, θ1(x) = 1+x, s = 5 and a = 3. Then 
A computes f = s
a
 = 5
3 ≡ 5 (mod ϕ(7)). Then A's public 
key is (n = 3, h(x) = 1+x+x
3
, θ1(x) = 1+x, s = 5, f = 5). 
To encrypt the message m(x) = x
2
, B selects a random 
integer k=3 and computes, r=s
k 
=5
3 ≡5 (mod ϕ(7)), 
q=f
k
 (mod 6) ≡5, and δ(x)= m(x)q (mod 1+x+x3) ≡ 1+x. 
B sends (r,δ(x)).   
To decrypt the message A computes b = 6 − 3 = 3 and t 
= r
b  
= 5
3
 mod 6 = 5. Finally, A computes δ(x)t = 
(1+x)
3 
 (mod 1+x+x
3
) ≡ x2.  
4. Testing and Evaluation 
The modified Elgamal cryptosystem was tested and 
evaluated by implementing the modified algorithms. 
We used Mathematica 7.0 as a programming language 
and an HP computer with 1.73 GHZ CPU and 1014 
MB RAM.  
   Using Mathematica 7.0, we have written programs 
for the following algorithms: 
1. Elgamal with n in the form 2.3
α
. 
2. Elgamal with n in the form 4.3
α
. 
3. Elgamal with n in the form 3
α
. 
4. Elgamal with n in the form 3.p. 
5. Elgamal with n in the form 3.2
α
.p.   
6. Elgamal with n in the form 2.p
 α
+1. 
7. Elgamal over the polynomial case. 
 
After running the programs, it was clear that all the 
programs have generated a public and private key. A 
message is encrypted and is sent to a decryption 
scheme which recovered the message. 
      Table 3 and Figure 3 show the results obtained 
after running the Mathematica programs for 100 times. 
For more information on these programs, readers are 
referred to [5]. 
 
Table 4. Elgamal evaluation. 
Algorithm 
Key 
Generation 
Encryption Decryption 
n=3^a 972.158 5116.84 2801.47 
n=2.3^a 1941.4 10302.2 5669.9 
n=2p^a+1 2.4 2.35 7736.1 
n=4.3^a 2651.25 14160.9 2.13333 
n=3.p 2.3 6.81421*10^(-15) 6.81421*10^(-15) 
n=3.4.p 2.35 0.75 5.14996*10^(-15) 
Poly case 937.5 20.4 3.15 
 
 
Figure 1. Testing the modified Elgamal cryptosystems. 
 
Comparing these algorithms with one another, one can 
conclude the following: 
1. All programs are reliable. They can encrypt and 
decrypt any message. 
2. For the irreducible polynomial case, it took 
considerable time to find an irreducible polynomial 
of high degree. Moreover, it takes more time to 
generate the public and private key than to decrypt 
or encrypt a message. Finally, it takes a 
considerable time to find some of the elements of 
U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) when the degree of h(x) is high. 
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3. For cases 2, 3 and 4, the time needed for encryption 
is more than that needed for generating public and 
private keys and for decryption. But it works well 
even for a=10000.   
4. Cases 5, 6 and 7 are more efficient than others since 
they work for every prime number, even for primes 
consisting of 13 digits and they require less time for 
encryption, decryption and key generation. 
5. The case where n = 3p is the most efficient since it 
takes the least time for encryption, key generation 
and decryption. 
6. In case 7, the time needed for decryption was much 
more than that needed for key generation and 
encryption. 
 
4.1. The Discrete Logarithm Problem 
The security of the El-gamal cryptosystem depends on 
the intractability of the Discrete Logarithm Problem: 
Let G be a finite cyclic group of order n. Let a be a 
generator of G, and Gβ ∈ . The Discrete Logarithm of 
β  to the base a, denoted by logα β , is the unique 
integer x, 0 x n 1≤ ≤ − , such that xaβ = . 
To attack the modified Elgamal cryptosystem, we 
have to solve the Discrete Logarithm Problem. The 
most popular attack algorithm is the Baby-Step Giant-
Step algorithm [11]: 
Let m n =   , where n is the order of a. If 
xaβ = , then one can write x = im + j, where 
0 i , j m≤ < . Hence, x i m ja a a= , which implies  
m i j( a ) aβ − = . 
Algorithm 16: Baby-Step Giant-Step algorithm 
Input: a generator of a cyclic group G of order n, and an 
element  Gβ ∈  
Output: the discrete logarithm  x logα β= . 
1. Set  m n =   . 
2. Construct a table with entries (j,
ia ) for 0 j m≤ < . 
Sort this table by the second component. 
3. Compute 
ma−  and  set γ β←  . 
4. For i from 0 to m-1 do the following: 
4.1 Check if is the second component of some entry in 
the table, 
4.2 If 
jaγ =  then return x = im + j, 
4.3 Set 
m.aγ −← . 
Below is a list of the implemented attack algorithms: 
1. Baby giant with n = 2.3
α
. 
2. Baby giant with n = 4.3
α
. 
3. Baby giant with n = 3
α
. 
4. Baby giant with n = 3.p. 
5. Baby giant with n = 3.2
α
.p.   
6. Baby giant with n = 2.p
 α
+1. 
7. Irreducible polynomial baby giant. 
In order to attack any protocol that uses Elgamal 
public key encryption scheme we have to solve the 
discrete logarithm problem. We enhanced the baby 
step giant step algorithm to work with the modified 
algorithms. Table 5 and Figure. 2 show the results of 
running the programs 100 times in each case. 
Table 5. Baby step giant step attack. 
Algorithm Time needed in atto sec 
n=3^a 3.04119) 
n=2.3^a 3.07689 
n=2p^a+1 4.34042 
n=4.3^a 3.20547 
n=3.p 5.0357 
n=3.4.p 2.96404) 
Poly case 11.3508 
 
         
Figure 2. The baby step giant step algorithm evaluation. 
 
After running these attack algorithms, we observed the 
following: 
1. All the attack programs are reliable so that they can 
hack an encrypted message by finding the private 
key. 
2. In all the cases, the time needed to attack the 
modified cryptosystem is approximately the same.  
3. The most difficult to attack is the irreducible 
polynomial case. This is due to the fact that 
mathematically it is complex and needs 
considerable computing time to find the modulus of 
a given polynomial with respect to a certain 
irreducible polynomial. 
4. We were not able to run the programs on large 
values of p and large powers since it would take a 
considerable time to generate some of the elements 
of the second group of units in each case. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we extended the Elgamal cryptosystem 
using the second group of units. We presented 
algorithms for the extended cryptosystem in the setting 
of U
2
(Zn) and provided numerical examples to illustrate 
the proposed scheme. We provided algorithms for the 
case of the second group of units of Z2[x]/<h(x)> where 
h(x) is an irreducible polynomial. We also provided 
proofs that the proposed scheme does really recover 
the plaintext from the ciphertext. We also conducted 
testing and evaluation of the proposed scheme.  
Baby Step Giant Step Attack Algorithm Evaluation 
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As for future work, we are currently investigating 
the case of n = 8.3
α 
and 16.3
α
 where different 
algorithms would be used. This due to the fact that 4 is 
relatively prime with neither 2.3
α
 nor 4.3
α
. We can also 
considering the cases where h(x) = x
2
 and when h(x) is 
a product of irreducible polynomials whose degrees are 
pairwise relatively prime and using time stamps [13]. 
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